From 2016 to 2018, I commanded “Operation Good Neighbor,” through which Israel provided extensive humanitarian assistance to Syrians harmed by the country’s ongoing civil war. The effort included medical treatment in Israel, the provision of medicine, food, fuel and civilian equipment, and support for hospitals and clinics inside Syria.

The operation was possible because the Syrian state had effectively disappeared from much of the country’s south. Longtime Syrian President Bashar Assad had lost control over wide swathes of the country, while local communities and rebel organizations managed daily life independently. Israel could communicate with them directly without going through Damascus.

That reality is gone.

Since the Assad regime fell in December 2024 and the civil war ended, Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s new president, has worked to reconcentrate political and military power in Damascus. Government control remains incomplete, but most Sunni power centers in the south no longer operate autonomously or maintain open ties with Israel. Many have been absorbed into new institutions.

Even where residents remain open to contact with Israel, Damascus can portray such ties as treason and brand local communities as collaborators. Encouraging Syrians to act against their government could therefore endanger the very people Israel seeks to help.

Israel cannot re-establish “Operation Good Neighbor” in its original form. The question is how to adapt its underlying principle to a reality in which Damascus can no longer be bypassed.

That principle is simple: Civilian stability is a security asset.

A population with access to basic services and employment is less vulnerable to recruitment by jihadist groups, criminal networks and foreign militias. It will not necessarily become an ally, but it may prevent Israel’s enemies from establishing themselves nearby.

Instead of an “Operation Good Neighbor 2,” Israel needs a new civilian-security policy for southern Syria, built on three layers.

First, civilian stability should be incorporated into any future security arrangement between Israel and Damascus; not as a vague declaration, but as a reciprocal and measurable commitment.

Israel and Syria have already engaged in U.S.-mediated contacts focused largely on military presence, buffer zones and security commitments. But security in southern Syria cannot be measured only by the number of troops and tanks near the border.

Israel could transfer non-sensitive knowledge in agriculture and veterinary medicine, including vaccination programs, irrigation and drought management to Syria. In return, Syria should accept verifiable obligations, such as removing anti-Israel content from its official school curriculum after decades of indoctrination under Assad.

Such an arrangement would not depend on trust. Vaccination programs can be verified, and textbooks can be examined. Israel should not finance Syria’s reconstruction or transfer money without oversight, but it can condition security, economic or diplomatic concessions on measurable progress.

Second, Israel should work through intermediaries.

Rather than asking local leaders to defy Damascus, Israel can advance civilian assistance through the United States, Jordan, the Gulf states and international organizations. Jordan has direct security concerns along its border with Syria, the Gulf states possess economic influence, and the United States can link security arrangements to political and economic incentives.

Not every form of assistance must carry an Israeli flag. Yet my experience during “Operation Good Neighbor” taught me that even unbranded aid is often quickly identified as Israeli.

When we delivered flour to communities relatively far from the border, Syrians told us that residents recognized its origin because of its quality. According to them, the Israeli flour produced better-tasting bread, appeared richer and remained fresh longer than flour purchased locally or donated by other countries.

The important distinction is not between aid whose origin is discovered and aid whose origin remains secret. It is between assistance quietly recognized through its quality and an Israeli presence advertised in a way that forces Damascus to respond publicly. The goal should not be secrecy at any cost, but discretion.

Quiet and indirect Israeli influence can improve civilian conditions, reduce the space available to extremists and preserve the understanding that Israel is also capable of providing high- quality assistance in times of distress.

Third, Israel should maintain an emergency humanitarian capability.

It should preserve information channels, medical capacity and contingency plans for a massacre of minorities, local institutional collapse, a wave of refugees towards the border or the establishment of a jihadist organization nearby. This should be an emergency asset, not a permanent network of local actors working for Israel.

The southern Syrian city of Sweida and Syria’s Druze population require separate consideration.

Local Druze forces still retain significant control. Moreover, Israel cannot ignore a genuine threat to the Druze, especially given its bond with its own Druze citizens. The question is how to protect them without harming their long-term position.

In practice, overt Israeli support has reinforced the Druze community’s existing isolation within Syria. Among significant parts of the Syrian public, the Druze of Sweida are increasingly viewed not only as a minority seeking to defend itself, but as a community relying on and cooperating with Israel. This perception is shaped by broader internal Syrian tensions as well as by Israel’s visible involvement, but its political and social consequences for the Druze are already real.

This perception affects their relations with neighboring Sunni and Bedouin populations and their ability to integrate into a broader Syrian framework. Sweida must therefore not become a model for all of southern Syria. Visible and permanent Israeli sponsorship risks turning every local crisis into an open-ended Israeli security commitment.

Israel should make clear that the massacre of minorities is a red line. At the same time, it should work towards a Syrian arrangement that protects the Druze, permits a degree of local self-governance and does not turn them into an enclave wholly dependent on Israel.

The new government in Damascus is not necessarily a partner for peace. Its leaders’ jihadist background and violence against minorities demand suspicion, oversight and enforceable conditions.

But as the central government again becomes the dominant actor in Syria’s south, Israel cannot assume that Damascus can be bypassed indefinitely.

Damascus may not be a partner, but it is an address for responsibility. Israel should demand that it prevent jihadist entrenchment, protect minorities, stop smuggling and preserve stability near the border. Any diplomatic concession, international support for reconstruction or change in Israel’s military posture should be conditioned on real and measurable progress.

“Operation Good Neighbor” succeeded because it was compatible with an unusual reality in which the Syrian state had vanished, and local communities were left on their own. Its success is not a reason to copy the operation under fundamentally different conditions.

The real lesson of leadership is knowing the difference between a principle worth preserving and a method whose time has passed.

Israel does not need another such operation. It needs a policy that recognizes that border security will be determined not only by which forces are kept away from southern Syria, but also by the civilian reality that takes shape within it.