Yossi Cohen, the former head of the Mossad who oversaw operations such as the theft of the Iranian nuclear archive, has offered a stunning revelation regarding the reach of the agency’s global surveillance.

The pager operation, which hurt dozens of Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist operatives in September 2024 by having them unwittingly turn on an explosive device on their communication devices that the Mossad had manipulated, was merely one element of a far wider, systematic deployment of sophisticated devices worldwide, although notably absent in the Gaza Strip, Cohen told The Brink podcast.

Cohen revealed the extent of the equipment manipulation operation, stating, “You know how much equipment, I mean treated equipment, that we have in these countries? You can’t. You don’t. I do.”

When asked to name specific countries, he equivocated but revealed that the treated equipment is spread across virtually every potential theater of operation, confirming that these devices are present “in all the countries that you can imagine.”

This global reach stems from a concept Cohen claims to have personally invented. He described this strategy as both the “pager method” and the “manipulated equipment method,” which he developed in “2002 to 2004.”

The key is to bypass traditional barriers by embedding oneself in the enemy’s logistics. “If I know that Iran, or other countries, or other organizations, are buying something that I can infiltrate their supply chain, I will do so.”

Cohen confirmed that his concept had been used previously, noting, “We have already used it, manipulating equipment in the Second Lebanon War” against Hezbollah in 2006.

The invention and early development relied heavily on the Mossad’s technical division. Cohen stressed, “the manipulated equipment method” was developed together with the head of the tech division in the Mossad. “He was my best partner.”

Despite Israel’s widespread deployment of the system, Cohen noted the lack of such equipment in the Gaza Strip. When questioned about the operational deployment there, he admitted to a significant deficit, noting, “Not Gaza. Not enough.”

He suggested that had the intelligence capability been stronger in Gaza, events there might have unfolded differently. “If we had it, I mean, we knew something about them coming something, right? I would have sold them everything. Just everything.”

Institutional opposition

Cohen said that he faced powerful institutional opposition from both the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) and the IDF when he attempted to assume control of intelligence operations for the Gaza Strip before the Hamas onslaught on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.

The Brink interviewer introduced the subject by noting that when Cohen “first came in as head of Mossad [in 2016, he] saw that there was not enough intelligence coming in from Gaza.”

Recognizing this crucial deficiency, Cohen, according to the interviewer, actively “begs to be put in charge of Gaza” in an effort to implement necessary changes, particularly as thought the security establishment currently functioned like an “echo chamber.”

Cohen justified documenting this internal struggle in his recent book, The Sword of Freedom: Israel, Mossad, and the Secret War, saying that he decided to “take my gloves off a little” because “the people should know, all right, my position, the people should know Mossad’s position.”

He explained his public criticism as necessary to highlight the organization’s unique value, asserting, “The people should know and appreciate Mossad’s capabilities more.” By drawing attention to the Mossad’s efficacy, Cohen argued that its proven capabilities were being improperly restricted due to institutional ego.

But this initiative was forcefully rejected by the agencies that traditionally held jurisdiction over the Gaza arena. Cohen said he was “blocked” by the “Shin Bet and the IDF Intelligence Directorate as well.”

Cohen said that these supposed blocking maneuvers stemmed from deep-seated cultural arrogance within these organizations, stating, “The culture says we’re OK, we don’t need you, we’re fine, don’t tell us what to do, we are the IDF, we are Shin Bet, the equivalent to the U.K.’s MI5.”

He said that the truth of his critique—that intelligence was lacking—was undeniable. He added that he had told and written that they “Have nothing sufficient on the level of intelligence” before Oct. 7.

Cohen noted that the truth of this failure was widely acknowledged within the intelligence community: “If you ask my subordinates at Mossad, everybody remembers that. Everybody at the Shin Bet remembers.”

The consequence of being blocked was a critical gap in capabilities, he said. Cohen lamented that while the Mossad was successful elsewhere, intelligence on Gaza was dangerously limited.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.

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