Apocalyptic Crisis Averted by Valor of IDF and Israeli Citizens Mobilizing to Defend the Nation’s Most Sensitive Locations
A forthcoming book by Israeli journalist and author Ilan Kfir, interviewed on Kan Reshet Bet, claiming that the invasion of southern Israel by Hamas and others could have been much, much worse – because of the second phase of Yahya Sinwar’s malevolent plan was thwarted by the mobilization, better late than never, of the IDF and civilian heroes, blocking a planned advance by the terrorists northward.
Listen to the original hebrew interview here:
“Today the picture is much clearer than what it was around October 7th. Hamas was not satisfied with the first phase of the plan, and the test was whether the plan would succeed and would go to the second phase – and he was ready with large forces on standby, ready to set off at noon,” Kfir says.
Kfir explained: “The peak of the plan was to breakthrough on two routes, north, as well as south and east, towards Dimona, which was marked as a very central target. The culmination of the attack was going to be a raid on Tel Aviv. They had marked several locations in the city that were expected to have large crowds in the afternoon and evening, and they were ready to carry out a major massacre there. Those who had planned to reach Tel Aviv and northwards were mainly forces who were ready to commit suicide, because they knew they had no chance of coming back from there. It was a plan that had been formulated and planned at very advanced stages.”
The plan did not remain only on paper. “Towards noon on October 7th, when Sinwar and his command group realized that they had achieved more than planned, he gave the order to the forces of Phase Two to set off. But at this stage, they encountered a big surprise because, unlike in the morning – when everything was open and no one was ready – here full plans had already been put into action, large forces had already moved into the Nevatim region and a large blockade was set up.”
“There is no doubt that if Hamas had carried out Phase Two, the trauma and disaster would have doubled,” Kfir stresses. “Sinwar believed that if the news channels reported that he had attacked in Tel Aviv and Dimona, Hezbollah in the north and the other terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria would also have attacked. It’s a demonic plan that, had it succeeded, the reality would have been many times worse.”
Kfir also reported: “Maps found on terrorists indicated that they had intended to reach Kiryat Gat. They also found plans to attack the Shikma Prison in Ashkelon and release terrorists, and to attack the air force basis at Hatzerim,” the largest in the south. This all showed Sinwar’s arrogance in doing something that had never been done before.”
Israeli intelligence had been privy to Hamas’ elaborate assault plans a full year prior to the October 7 attack. A comprehensive document, absent a specific date but detailing a multifaceted offensive designed to overwhelm Israel’s defenses, circulated among officials. Codenamed “Jericho Wall,” this plan anticipated the deployment of rockets, drones, and ground forces employing paragliders and motorcycles to penetrate Israeli territory . Despite the complexity, some leaders initially underestimated Hamas’ capability to execute such a plan. However, the attack materialized as feared, claiming 1,200 lives and resulting in the abduction of 200 hostages. It underscored a grave underestimation of Hamas’ preparedness, evidenced by their significant training exercises that mirrored the attack blueprint. An Israeli signals intelligence analyst’s warnings, suggesting that Hamas was priming for a significant operation, were unfortunately overlooked until it was too late .
Despite the failure to mobilize on October 7 till the afternoon, the IDF’s valor stood out, particularly during the aftermath and the thwarted second phase blocking the Arabs audacious move towards Tel Aviv, Dimona and Hatzerim. The resilience was punctuated by the loss of hundreds of soldiers, police, and civilians who died fight the invaders from Gaza on that darkest of days.
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