by Chaim Weber Perhaps the most famous murder trial in American history was the trial of former National Football League running back O.J. Simpson. Though he was acquitted on criminal charges for the murder of his ex-wife and her friend, a 2016 survey found that the vast majority of Americans believed him to be guilty. What if Mr. Simpson was indeed guilty but preemptively admitted to his crime in beis din? Would there be an exemption for preemptively admitting the crime? The Rule of Modeh B’knas Pattur – How Far Does it Go? There is a halacha that if one admits to a financial penalty (modeh b’knas), he is exempt. The Gemara in Bava Kamma (75a) brings two sources for this halacha. One is from the verse “asher yarshiun elokim – that the judges found him guilty.” This excludes one who incriminates himself. A second source is from the verse regarding a thief paying the fine of keifel (double payment). There, the Torah repeats the phrase “himatzei timatzei.” The repetition tells us that a thief can be incriminated by witnesses (himatzei) or judges (timatzei) but not by one’s own admission. The amoraim Rav and Shmuel debate why two verses are needed. Rav holds one verse comes to exempt an ordinary modeh b’knas. The second verse exempts a modeh b’knas even where witnesses come after the admission to incriminate the guilty party. Even though witnesses are now testifying that the defendant is guilty, his preemptive admission exempts him. Shmuel argues. He holds a preemptive admission will not exempt a defendant from knas if witnesses later come. The reason why the Torah has two verses according to Shmuel is for an entirely different reason: One verse exempts an ordinary thief who admits and the second exempts a watchman who steals an item entrusted to his care but then admits to it. By both cases, we need a dedicated verse telling us that a modeh b’knas is exempt. Now, let’s discuss the application of all this to dinei nefashos (offenses with capital punishment). By dinei nefashos, a defendant is never liable unless there are two witnesses against him. That said, what if a defendant admits to a crime that has capital punishment, like murder, and witnesses come afterwards to incriminate the defendant? Can the defendant’s preemptive admission exempt him punishment? According to Shmuel, this is a non-starter, as preemptive admission doesn’t exempt a defendant when witnesses subsequently come, even by cases of knas. However, we pasken like Rav that preemptive admission can exempt the defendant even when witnesses subsequently come. According to Rav, would that exemption also apply to dinei nefashos or is it limited to cases of knas? Rashi (Makkos 5a) appears to say that the exemption does apply to dinei nefashos. Similarly, Rashi in Zevachim (71a) says that if one admits in beis din that their ox gored and killed, that ox is exempt from stoning. Tosfos there notes that Rashi is based on the Rashi in Maseches Makkos that modeh b’knas pattur applies to dinei nefashos. Tosfos argues, pointing out that we don’t find this exemption anywhere. Furthermore, Tosfos wonders that if this exemption truly applies also to dinei nefashos, any guilty party can preemptively admit to their crime in beis din simply to avoid punishment. The Maharatz Chayes defends […]  | Read More The Yeshiva World