Ron Dermer’s quiet message to mediators signals tactical flexibility on a phased hostage deal, even as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel’s security cabinet emphasize victory over Hamas and reject frameworks that leave the terror group intact.

At first glance, a Channel 13–based report carried by the Times of Israel sounded like a shift in Israel’s posture. Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, one of the Prime Minister’s closest and most trusted advisers, reportedly told mediators that Israel had not definitively ruled out a partial hostage deal. This was a subtle contrast to the government’s recent public insistence that only a comprehensive package—bringing home all hostages and ensuring Hamas’s elimination—was on the table.

The nuance is familiar to anyone who has observed Israeli crisis diplomacy: maintain overwhelming military pressure while leaving negotiating channels cracked open. Dermer’s message was not a departure from the government’s line so much as an acknowledgment that in the right circumstances, tactical flexibility may serve Israel’s overarching strategic goals.

Just weeks earlier, a senior Israeli official briefed reporters in stark terms: “There will be no more partial deals.” That statement, which came at the beginning of August, was delivered to emphasize both to Hamas and to international mediators that Jerusalem, with Washington’s backing, had pivoted toward a comprehensive framework. The aim was clear: defeat Hamas militarily, dismantle its governing apparatus, and return all hostages—without slipping into piecemeal arrangements that Hamas could exploit.

Yet in Cabinet sessions and quiet conversations, the tone has been more pragmatic. At a tense Security Cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to even present a Hamas-backed framework for debate, describing it as “not on the table.” He argued that any pause in operations without achieving total victory would encourage future kidnappings. Ministers from the right flank demanded that the proposal be formally killed, while Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi pressed to at least consider it as a means of saving lives. Netanyahu’s position remained firm: Israel cannot afford to trade away battlefield gains for a temporary pause that leaves Hamas breathing.

Dermer himself, however, was reported by Ynet to have offered a more calibrated assessment. He made clear his preference for a comprehensive deal in line with Washington’s position. But when pressed by Netanyahu on whether Israel would automatically reject a partial framework if Hamas advanced one, Dermer replied cautiously: “If such an offer comes, we’ll see.” It was a classic expression of his role—aligning with the strategic objective of defeating Hamas while preserving space for tactical maneuvering.

The question then becomes: what does a “partial deal” look like? The outline Hamas said it had accepted in mid-August, as reported by international wire services, involved a 60-day truce; phased returns of living hostages and bodies of the dead; significant prisoner releases; partial IDF withdrawals inside Gaza; and follow-on talks toward a permanent ceasefire. From Israel’s perspective, this is laden with dangers: a long pause that allows Hamas to rearm, lopsided prisoner concessions, costly withdrawals from territory won with blood, and no guarantee Hamas is truly dismantled at the end of the process.

Against that backdrop, Dermer’s quiet outreach also underscores the government’s dual track. In late August, he met senior Qatari officials in France, the first such senior contact since earlier breakdowns. These talks were not a sign of softness but part of Israel’s tested strategy: use discreet channels to test whether increased military pressure is improving negotiating conditions, while maintaining the overarching course of victory.

The broader strategic environment reinforces this interpretation. In parallel to the war in Gaza, the Israeli leadership is weighing how to respond to European moves toward recognizing a Palestinian state. One option actively discussed is applying Israeli sovereignty to parts of Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”). Such deliberations highlight a government intent on deterrence, consolidation, and reshaping the regional order—not one seeking to trade away hard-won gains for short-term quiet.

The interplay of rhetoric and reality is therefore deliberate. Publicly, Netanyahu stresses that there will be no more “partial deals,” framing this as a matter of national survival. Inside the Cabinet, Dermer and others keep space open to adapt if circumstances allow. For Israel, the key principle remains that Hamas cannot emerge intact. Any deal, whether phased or comprehensive, will be judged by that single criterion: does it move Israel closer to the defeat of Hamas and the safe return of hostages, or does it risk squandering leverage and prolonging the threat?

Might Israel still compromise with Hamas instead of defeating it? Strategically, the answer remains no. The governing coalition, the IDF, and much of the public agree that allowing Hamas to survive would mean condemning Israel to further October 7-style atrocities. Tactically, however, Jerusalem may choose sequencing that extracts hostages sooner while ensuring that operations continue until Hamas’s capacity to govern and wage war is irreparably broken.

Dermer’s phrase—“we’ll see”—is emblematic. It does not signal weakness, but rather Israel’s intent to balance military determination with prudent flexibility. If an offer appears that saves lives without derailing victory, Israel will examine it. But the strategic path is set: Hamas will not be left standing.