Strategic move seeks to turn local rivals against terror group, weaken Hamas control in Rafah, and safeguard IDF soldiers during ongoing Gaza operations.

In a controversial shift in Israel’s Gaza strategy, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed this week that Israel has “activated” rival Palestinian clans inside the Gaza Strip to challenge Hamas’s control—particularly in the embattled city of Rafah. The effort marks a return to a classic counterinsurgency tactic: empower local forces to erode support for a common enemy. But the move has also ignited political debate, with critics claiming it carries long-term risks.

“We made use of clans in Gaza that are opposed to Hamas… What’s wrong with that? It’s only good. It saves the lives of IDF soldiers,” Netanyahu said in a recent closed-door meeting, later confirmed by multiple sources. For the Prime Minister, this isn’t about ideology but hard military pragmatism: create friction within Gaza to reduce the burden on IDF troops who are fighting Hamas in dense urban environments.

One of the main figures reportedly tied to this approach is Yasser Abu Shabab, who leads an armed group in Rafah composed of members from a powerful local clan with historical tensions with Hamas. Abu Shabab has denied receiving Israeli support, insisting his group operates independently to protect aid convoys and fill the security vacuum left by Hamas’s retreat. “We are not working for Israel,” he told Arabic media. “We are working to protect our people from the chaos Hamas has left behind.”

Still, the optics of arming Palestinians in Gaza—even those opposed to Hamas—have triggered pushback. Critics inside Israel, including some within the security establishment, warn that arming militias with unclear allegiances could backfire. The concern is that today’s ally could become tomorrow’s adversary. Similar scenarios in Lebanon and Syria remind observers that local militias, once empowered, often pursue their own agendas.

Opposition leader Yair Lapid condemned the move, accusing Netanyahu of repeating past mistakes. “This is a failed policy recycled from before October 7,” he said. “It’s the same thinking that let Hamas grow in the first place.” Others echoed this sentiment, arguing that Israel should focus on fully dismantling Hamas and restoring centralized security control, not outsourcing that control to what some have called “warlords.”

Yet there is a practical logic behind Netanyahu’s strategy. Many clans in Gaza have historically resisted Hamas rule. In fact, several of the large families—including the Abu Shabab and Abu Samhadana clans—have deep-rooted grievances with the terror group, ranging from political suppression to targeted assassinations. By tapping into these internal rivalries, Israel creates pressure on Hamas from within, forcing it to expend resources on internal security rather than external attacks.

Defense officials reportedly view the approach as a limited, temporary tactic rather than a long-term alliance. “This is not about arming an alternative government in Gaza,” one senior official was quoted as saying. “It’s about enabling natural opponents of Hamas to regain their strength during a window of opportunity.”

For Netanyahu, the decision also reinforces his broader doctrine: that Israel must act unilaterally, flexibly, and decisively to protect itself in the absence of international will or reliable Palestinian partners. His supporters argue that the current U.S. administration under President Trump, while publicly supportive of Israeli security needs, is constrained by optics and domestic politics, leaving Israel little choice but to act creatively.

The policy does raise open questions. Who oversees these local forces? What rules of engagement apply to them? How does Israel prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands or from being used against Israeli troops or civilians in the future? These are legitimate concerns. But in the current fog of war—where hostages remain in Hamas tunnels, Rafah is a stronghold of enemy fighters, and ceasefire talks are deadlocked—Netanyahu’s move can be seen as part of a broader improvisational war effort.

“This isn’t ideal,” a former IDF general told Channel 14. “But war rarely is. The key is to keep Hamas off balance. If that means turning some of their enemies into temporary partners, so be it.”

As Israel’s campaign in Gaza nears its ninth month, and with Hamas’s leadership still hidden or in exile, the use of internal Gaza factions may become one of the few viable tools left to erode the terror group’s grip. The question is not whether it’s risky—but whether the risk is calculated enough to pay off. For now, Netanyahu seems to believe it is.