Israel and the United States discuss Phase Two of the Gaza agreement, but with Hamas refusing disarmament and no enforcing authority willing to step in, the process may be impossible to implement. President Trump has promised phase two by Christmas, but that present may not appear under his tree.

The push toward Phase Two of the Gaza deal has accelerated in recent days, but every official involved in the diplomatic track acknowledges the same immovable problem: Hamas has no intention of surrendering its weapons, and no force exists today that can compel it to do so. Without resolving that fundamental point, the second phase cannot function as designed.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected in Washington on December 29 for meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump. Both governments have described the visit as central to mapping out the transition from Phase One — largely focused on hostages, aid, and temporary security arrangements — into Phase Two, which centers on demilitarization and the emergence of a new governing authority in Gaza.

Trump said last week that “movement toward Phase Two” is expected before the Christmas break. The remark was widely interpreted in Washington and Jerusalem as a sign that the administration wants visible progress by year’s end. But political momentum does not solve the operational dilemma. Phase Two requires Hamas to hand over its weapons, dissolve its armed wing, and relinquish control. Hamas has openly rejected all three.

Over the past several days, Hamas officials have reiterated to Western and Arab media outlets that the organization will not accept any process that includes forced disarmament or a foreign military authority inside Gaza. The group has said it may consider discussions about “arrangements” after a permanent ceasefire, but it will not disband its fighters or turn over arms. For Israeli and American officials, this is precisely the unresolved core of the conflict: Gaza cannot be stabilized while a heavily armed militant faction retains decisive power.

Inside Israel, the position is unequivocal. The current Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, stated in recent briefings that Israel’s strategic objective remains the disarmament of Hamas and the prevention of its return to military or political control. Katz has emphasized repeatedly that demilitarization is indispensable for any future civilian administration in Gaza, regardless of international preferences. Security officials close to the process have noted this week that “no governing alternative is viable while Hamas retains weapons.”

The IDF, for its part, continues operations targeting tunnel networks, weapons depots, and command nodes. Operational communiqués released between December 6 and 9 confirm that tunnel systems remain active in several districts and that Hamas cells continue to operate within dense urban zones. The military’s assessment remains consistent: Hamas’s force structure has been degraded but not dismantled.

Internationally, the plan faces its own failure point. The U.S.-backed concept for a multinational stabilization force — envisioned to replace Israel’s direct military presence in the second phase — is encountering universal resistance. No Arab state has agreed to send troops into Gaza unless Hamas is already disarmed. European governments have expressed readiness for humanitarian support but not for military confrontation with a still-armed militant movement. Western diplomats working the file acknowledge that no country is willing to deploy without a viable mandate, rules of engagement, and guarantees of force protection — none of which exist today.

Israeli analysts note the danger of moving to Phase Two without disarmament: a civilian governing body would be installed on paper but would operate under the shadow of an armed organization still capable of coercive control — a repeat of the Lebanese model, where an official government coexists with a dominant militia. Several commentators on Israeli broadcasters over the weekend warned that “a premature transition will produce an authority that survives only at Hamas’s pleasure.”

Netanyahu’s upcoming Washington visit is expected to address precisely these contradictions. Israeli officials say the prime minister will present a clear position: Israel is committed to the diplomatic framework, but it will not accept a scenario in which it withdraws while Hamas’s armed wing remains intact. The issue is not political alignment — the U.S. and Israel agree in principle on the end state — but operational feasibility. No one has yet identified a force capable and willing to disarm Hamas if Hamas refuses.

For the United States, the challenge is equally stark. Trump’s declaration of imminent progress relies on the assumption that Phase Two mechanisms can be stood up rapidly. But without an enforcement pillar, the second phase cannot produce the desired outcome: an orderly transition to a non-Hamas governing entity, supported by international actors, and capable of stabilizing Gaza. American officials privately concede that while the political framework is attractive on paper, the real-world path is deeply uncertain.

As mid-December approaches, the gap between the diplomatic script and the ground reality is widening. Hamas retains weapons, fighters, and operational command. No foreign force will enter to impose disarmament. Israel will not withdraw without it. And Washington cannot push forward a phase that lacks an enforceable security foundation.

The question is therefore no longer whether Phase Two can be drafted, negotiated, or publicly endorsed. It is whether it can be implemented at all.