Channel 12’s Amit Segal reveals Mossad believed Hamas leaders were inside the targeted room because their phones were there—but the terror chiefs had stepped away for midday prayers, leaving Israel disappointed. 5 or 6 mid-level Hamas officials were killed but not the top dogs. Signal intelligence was there but the human intelligence fell short.

The September 9 Israeli airstrike in Doha was one of the most audacious operations in recent memory—an unprecedented strike deep inside Qatar against the exiled Hamas leadership. Israel’s intelligence services, with Mossad in the lead, believed they had pinpointed the inner circle of Hamas commanders as they gathered to deliberate over a ceasefire proposal. Instead, the strike killed close aides and guards but left the organization’s top brass alive.

On Tuesday, Channel 12 political analyst Amit Segal revealed the key reason behind the operational shortfall: Mossad had relied on the mobile phones of the Hamas leaders to confirm their presence in the meeting room. The phones were indeed there. But the men were not. According to Segal’s reporting, the terror chiefs had left for midday prayers, leaving behind the very signals that convinced Israeli intelligence they were in place.

The result was both a triumph and a frustration. Israel demonstrated that it could reach the Hamas high command even in Qatar, long a safe haven. Yet it fell just short of the historic decapitation strike it had hoped for.

The Operation and Its Targets

The strike was launched in the late afternoon, targeting a secure residential compound in Doha’s diplomatic quarter. The facility was under close surveillance by Israeli intelligence, which had tracked Hamas political bureau leaders as they traveled between meetings and consultations about the latest American-backed ceasefire plan.

Among the dead were Humam al-Hayya, the son of Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s Gaza chief; his office director, Jihad Abu Labal; three bodyguards; and a Qatari security officer assigned to the compound. Hamas quickly claimed that all senior leaders had survived. Israeli officials were initially cautious, but many privately believed that at least some senior figures were present at the time of the strike.

Segal’s revelation underscores why the outcome fell short: “The phones were there, but the men had gone to prayers,” he reported, describing the failure as a painful reminder of how overreliance on signals intelligence can mislead even the most seasoned agencies.

Lessons from Past Operations

Israel has often relied on phone-based intelligence to devastating effect. The 1996 assassination of Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’s master bombmaker, was carried out by means of a booby-trapped mobile phone. Since then, technological tracking has remained central to the IDF, Shin Bet, and Mossad toolkit.

But Hamas has learned. It has frequently used dummy phones, duplicate SIM cards, or deliberate misdirection to confuse surveillance. In this case, the misstep may have been simple chance: the leaders left their devices behind during the midday break, while attending prayers at a nearby mosque. That brief absence allowed them to evade Israel’s strike.

For the Mossad, the error was not one of lack of capability but of timing. The intelligence was sound, but the operational window closed in a matter of minutes. By the time the missiles struck, the true targets were no longer in their seats.

Netanyahu’s Response

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the strike the following day, praising Israel’s “long arm of justice” while stopping short of declaring victory. “Israel will pursue the murderers of our people wherever they hide,” he said, adding that the Doha operation sent a clear message that no sanctuary is permanent.

Netanyahu’s emphasis was on deterrence and persistence. He reminded the Israeli public that even partial successes serve to rattle Hamas leadership, force them into hiding, and demonstrate Israel’s determination.

Behind closed doors, however, officials acknowledged that the opportunity had been extraordinary. Had the timing been precise, Israel might have eliminated nearly the entire Hamas political bureau in one blow.

International Reactions

The strike drew immediate condemnation from Qatar, which labeled it a “flagrant violation of sovereignty.” Arab states including Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined in denouncing the operation, while the United Nations warned of heightened regional tensions.

In Washington, officials expressed unease but avoided sharp criticism. State Department spokespeople reiterated America’s commitment to Israel’s security while noting that diplomatic channels must remain open to pursue a ceasefire. Privately, American intelligence officials were reported to be astonished at Israel’s ability to penetrate Doha’s defenses and carry out a pinpoint strike in the heart of a U.S. ally’s capital.

European responses were similarly mixed: France and Germany called for restraint but avoided singling out Israel for blame.

Strategic Implications

The Doha strike highlights both Israel’s reach and the limitations of intelligence. By striking in Qatar, Israel crossed a threshold it had never breached before, signaling that Hamas leaders would no longer find immunity even in the Gulf. That message, regardless of the death toll, will weigh heavily on the group’s calculations.

Yet the failure to eliminate the top commanders also buys Hamas time. With its leadership intact, the group will attempt to project resilience. Its propaganda outlets have already seized on the narrative that “God protected the leadership at prayer,” turning what was a narrow escape into a tale of divine providence.

For Israel, the incident underscores the need for multi-layered intelligence confirmation. Phones and signals can suggest presence, but without corroborating visual or human intelligence, the risk of error remains. Analysts point to the need for tighter integration of Mossad HUMINT sources with real-time IDF operational decision-making.

Segal’s Framing

Amit Segal’s disclosure added new context to what many in Israel already suspected. Channel 12’s veteran analyst has frequently broken major stories on intelligence and political matters. By stating openly that the phones were present but the leaders were absent, Segal provided a credible explanation for why such a high-stakes strike came up short.

His framing shifts the debate from whether Israel misidentified the target to how the timing of the operation was compromised. The implication is not that the intelligence was false, but that Hamas outmaneuvered the window of attack—whether through deliberate countermeasures or sheer coincidence.

Looking Forward

The strike’s failure will not deter Israel. If anything, it may sharpen resolve. Senior ministers including Gideon Sa’ar and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant have already signaled that operations against Hamas leadership will continue “wherever they may be.”

The broader lesson, however, is about patience. Israeli intelligence may well wait for the next opportunity, but next time will insist on dual confirmation that the leaders themselves—not merely their phones—are in the room.

As one Israeli security official told local media off-record: “The phones will not fool us again. Next time we strike, we will strike when the men are present.”

Conclusion

The Doha operation was both daring and incomplete. Israel shook Hamas to its core, breached Qatar’s sense of sanctuary, and demonstrated once more that no enemy is beyond reach. Yet it missed the historic chance for a total decapitation strike because the terrorists left for prayers while their phones stayed behind.

Amit Segal’s Channel 12 revelation lays bare the anatomy of that failure: a fleeting intelligence gap, exploited by Hamas or left to chance, that robbed Israel of a decisive victory. For the Mossad and IDF, the lesson is clear—never assume the phone equals the man.