At every level and from each direction, the “perfect storm” of what the Hamas Al-Aqsa Flood attack took the Israeli Defence Forces and the Israeli leadership by surprise in a tragedy that could have been easily avoided. An interim report.

The tragic events of October 7, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, were the result of a combination of military, political, intelligence, and socio-political miscalculations. Below is a preliminary breakdown of the main causal factors that contributed to the failure to prevent or adequately respond to the attack. The details have leaked out increasingly in recent days and weeks, producing a flood of new information of the events leading up to the tragic and catastrophic outcome. Most recently, investigative journalist Avi Weiss and Channel 12’s Amir Bar Shalom, confirming that as many as 100 army legal officer subtantially delayed the Israeli response. A Channel 11 report showed the egregious underpreparedness and failures of the Israeli Air Force, including a commander (pictured) who was unaware that there was even a party at Nova until 4 pm in the afternoon.

1. Intelligence Failures

Israel’s renowned intelligence agencies failed to anticipate or respond effectively to the October 7 attack. Despite extensive monitoring of Gaza, several factors contributed to this oversight:

• Complacency: Israeli intelligence believed that Hamas had been sufficiently deterred from launching large-scale attacks due to past retaliatory operations. This assumption created a false sense of security.
• Focus on the West Bank: Israeli intelligence was more focused on unrest in the West Bank, diverting attention from Hamas’s military build-up in Gaza.
• Misinterpretation of Signals: Any signals coming from Gaza—such as increased tunnel activity, increased rocket production, Israeli SIM cards suddenly activated, or changes in Hamas rhetoric—were misinterpreted as routine drills, rather than preparations for a large-scale offensive.

2. Operational Gaps in Military Response

The military’s slow response to the Hamas assault was one of the most glaring failures on October 7:

• Inadequate Readiness at the Gaza Border: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stationed near Gaza were unprepared for the scale and coordination of the attack. Focus had shifted to the threat from Hezbollah in the north and Iran, leaving the southern front under-resourced.
• Air Force Underpreparedness: The Israeli Air Force in the south and central regions was caught woefully unprepared, significantly delaying a timely air response. This underpreparedness allowed Hamas to penetrate Israeli defenses and wreak havoc for hours before the IDF regained control of the situation.
• Helicopter Delays: Helicopters arrived too late to prevent the vehicles carrying hostages or fleeing Israelis from escaping. In some cases, this delayed action resulted in tragic outcomes, as helicopters were forced to engage vehicles carrying Israeli civilians, leading to casualties among hostages.
• Legal Hurdles: A requirement on October 7 to receive specific approval from legal authorities for each attack significantly delayed the IDF’s operational response. This bureaucratic delay hindered real-time decision-making, further complicating the military’s efforts to repel Hamas attackers.

3. Political and Strategic Miscalculations

Israel’s political leadership contributed to the fiasco by making a series of strategic misjudgments:

• Overconfidence in Deterrence: The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assumed that Hamas was effectively deterred and would not risk a major confrontation. This overconfidence, built on the policy of periodic military operations (“mowing the grass”), contributed to a lack of preparedness.
• Internal Political Distractions: Ongoing political turmoil, including deep polarization over judicial reforms, weakened the government’s focus on security threats. The protests and internal dissent distracted leadership from external threats and affected military readiness.
• Reserve Troops Understaffed: The refusal of many reservists to show up for duty in protest against the government’s judicial overhaul further undermined military readiness. This political protest left the IDF understaffed on October 7, particularly in critical southern regions near Gaza.
• Failure to Notify Political Leaders: Senior IDF officials failed to adequately inform the political leadership of intelligence reports suggesting an imminent attack. This communication breakdown meant that Israel’s political leadership was unprepared and did not have the opportunity to intervene early.

4. Underestimation of Hamas’s Capabilities

The Israeli security establishment underestimated Hamas’s ability to launch a complex, multi-faceted attack. This underestimation played a key role in the catastrophe:

• Tunnel Warfare Focus: Israel’s focus on dismantling Hamas’s tunnel network left it blind to Hamas’s evolving tactics. While tunnels remained a critical asset for Hamas, the group diversified its methods of attack.
• New Warfare Tactics: Hamas had developed a broader arsenal, including the use of drones, paragliders, and coordinated ground assaults. These new tactics caught the IDF by surprise, as they were primarily prepared for missile and rocket attacks.
• Failure to Identify Civilian Infrastructure Militarization: Hamas embedded its military assets within civilian areas, making it difficult for Israeli intelligence to assess the full scope of the threat. This concealment tactic was underestimated by Israeli security forces.

5. Technological Overreliance

Israel’s security apparatus leaned heavily on its technological superiority, which proved insufficient on October 7:

• Iron Dome Dependence: The Israeli military had grown overly reliant on the Iron Dome system to defend against Hamas’s rocket barrages. While effective against missiles, the Iron Dome did little to counter the ground-based assault that unfolded.
• Overconfidence in Surveillance Technology: The heavy reliance on electronic intelligence (SIGINT) and surveillance technologies led to a reduction in human intelligence (HUMINT), allowing Hamas to exploit blind spots and plan its attack without detection.

6. Civilian Preparedness and Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

The breach of Israel’s borders by Hamas fighters exposed critical vulnerabilities in civilian preparedness:

Failure of Early Warning Systems: Many early warning systems either failed or were too slow to alert communities in the south. As a result, civilians were unprepared for the imminent threat and became easy targets for Hamas fighters.

Unprotected Communities Near Gaza: Many of the communities near Gaza, including kibbutzim and towns, were not adequately fortified for an invasion. The residents were left unprotected as the IDF was slow to arrive.

Nature Party at Nova: A mass civilian gathering at the Nova nature party, located near the border, was not adequately safeguarded. Authorities were unaware of the gathering’s scale, leaving thousands of attendees vulnerable to Hamas’s onslaught.

We will continue to track these issues and those responsible, with the hope that those who commited by their actions and omissions will be exposed and held accountable.